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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
THREE ESSAYS ON HOSPITAL EFFICIENCY
by
Alfonso Rodriguez
Florida International University, 2011
Miami, Florida
Professor Peter Thompson, Major Professor
This dissertation analyzes hospital efficiency using various econometric techniques. The
first essay provides additional and recent evidence to the presence of contract manage-
ment behavior in the U.S. hospital industry. Unlike previous studies, which focus on
either an input-demand equation or the cost function of the firm, this paper estimates the
two jointly using a system of nonlinear equations. Moreover, it addresses the longitudi-
nal problem of institutions adopting contract management in different years, by creating
a matched control group of non-adopters with the same longitudinal distribution as the
group under study. The estimation procedure then finds that labor, and not capital,
is the preferred input in U.S. hospitals regardless of managerial contract status. With
institutions that adopt contract management benefiting from lower labor inefficiencies
than the simulated non-contract adopters. These results suggest that while there is a
propensity for expense preference behavior towards the labor input, contract managed
firms are able to introduce efficiencies over conventional, owner controlled, firms.
Using data for the years 1998 through 2007, the second essay investigates the pro-
duction technology and cost efficiency faced by Florida hospitals. A stochastic frontier
multiproduct cost function is estimated in order to test for economies of scale, economies
of scope, and relative cost efficiencies. The results suggest that small-sized hospitals ex-
v
perience economies of scale, while large and medium sized institutions do not. The
empirical findings show that Florida hospitals enjoy significant scope economies, regard-
less of size. Lastly, the evidence suggests that there is a link between hospital size
and relative cost efficiency. The results of the study imply that state policy makers
should be focused on increasing hospital scale for smaller institutions while facilitating
the expansion of multiproduct production for larger hospitals.
The third and final essay employs a two staged approach in analyzing the ef-
ficiency of hospitals in the state of Florida. In the first stage, the Banker, Charnes,
and Cooper model of Data Envelopment Analysis is employed in order to derive over-
all technical efficiency scores for each non-specialty hospital in the state. Additionally,
input slacks are calculated and reported in order to identify the factors of production
that each hospital may be over utilizing. In the second stage, we employ a Tobit re-
gression model in order to analyze the effects a number of structural, managerial, and
environmental factors may have on a hospital’s efficiency. The results indicated that
most non-specialty hospitals in the state are operating away from the efficient produc-
tion frontier. The results also indicate that the structural make up, managerial choices,
and level of competition Florida hospitals face have an impact on their overall technical
efficiency.
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CHAPTER 1
CONTRACT MANAGEMENT IN U.S. HOSPITALS
1.1 Introduction
The subletting of an institution’s management to a third-party firm has been around for
many years. This is known as contract management and it has been gaining traction in
the hospital industry in recent years. Contract management is the act of turning over
the day to day operations of an institution to a third-party firm which reports directly
to the institution’s board of directors or trustees (Brown & Money, 1976). However,
the third-party managers may or may not pursue the same objectives as the controllers
of the institution. For instance, the owners or controllers of an institution may be
profit maximizers, while the third-party managers may not be. Instead, the third-party
managers may have positive preferences for staff levels or wages well above the profit
maximizing amount. The idea that third-party managers may not have the same goals
as an institution’s controllers is know in the incentives literature as expense preference.
Expense preference is the notion that third-party managers are out to maximize
their utility instead of the institution’s profits. That is, third-party managers may have
preferences for inputs above and beyond the profit maximizing, or cost minimizing,
amount. Oddly enough, in the last two decades, contract management of U.S. hospitals
has been steadily rising. From 1980 to 2007, the share of U.S. hospitals under contract
management has increased around 70%, with roughly 18% of all current U.S. hospitals
choosing to outsource their management (See Figure 1.1).
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Figure 1.1: Percent of Non-Federal, Non-Specialty U.S.
Hospitals Under Contract Management
The question that comes readily to mind then is, has this increase in the adoption
of contract management by the U.S. hospital industry lead to expense preference be-
havior? And has it lead to greater inefficiency when compared to non-contract managed
hospitals?
This paper, thusly, sets out to test whether the adoption of contract manage-
ment, by U.S. hospitals, has lead to expense preference behavior and therefore to a
higher degree of inefficiency than conventionally managed hospitals. The paper contin-
ues as follows: section two reviews the related literature; a test for expense preference
is presented in section three; section four describes the data and outlines the creation
of the different samples used in the study; results are discussed in section five; and the
paper concludes in section six.
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1.2 Background
An alternative to the standard profit maximization theory is that of expense preference
behavior. The expense preference behavior theory hypothesizes that a firm’s third-party
manager may not have the goal of maximizing the firm’s profits. Instead, expense prefer-
ence suggests that the third-party manager may be a utility maximizer with preferences
for expenses above the profit maximizing level. That is, the separation of ownership from
control permits third-party managers to pursue non-profit maximizing objectives such
as higher salaries, job security, prestige, etc. The idea of expense preferences has been
around in the economic literature for some time and is one of that has been the founda-
tion for very interesting work (e.g., Baumol, 1957; Alchian & Kessel, 1962). However,
in the hospital industry this theory has been rarely examined, even though the majority
of institutions are not-for-profit and are rarely owned and managed by the same agents
(Carey & Dor, 2008).
The idea that utility maximizing managers indulge in excessive spending was first
suggested by Becker (1971). But, Baumol (1957); Marris (1957); Williamson (1963) took
the first steps in pioneering the theory of expense preference behavior. In particular,
Williamson (1963) was the first to argue that third-party managers derive additional
some sort of positive utility from expenditures above cost minimizing levels. Williamson
theorized that third-party managers derived utility from expenditures on salaries, ad-
ditional staff, or other fringe benefits for which the third-party managers may have a
positive preference. Williamson was also one of the first to argue for the importance of
empirical work in order to test for the existence of expense preference behavior.
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Yet, very few studies have been done in this field. The studies that have tested for the
existence of expense preference have mainly been in the banking and saving-and-loans
industry with results that have been somewhat mixed.
The first empirical framework capable of testing for the presence of expense prefer-
ence behavior was developed by Edwards (1977). Edwards postulated that the existence
of expense preference behavior was readily distinguishable in the institution’s demand
for labor. If an institution’s demand for labor was above the profit maximizing level,
then expense preference behavior was present. Applying his framework to the banking
industry, Edwards found that banks in his sample showed evidence of expense preference
behavior. Adding to Edwards, Hannan (1979) argued that the organizational structure
of the firm is an important element in determining the level of separation between an
institution’s owners and its third-party managers. Taking this into account, Hannan and
Mavinga (1980), along with Verbrugge and Jahera Jr (1981) used a similar test as that
proposed by Edwards, but incorporated more detailed information on the dispersion of
firm ownership in their model. They found that banks controlled by third-party man-
agers exhibited a tendency to spend more on items likely to be preferred than managers
from owner-controlled banks; thus, exhibiting expense preference behavior and lending
support to Edward’s results.
However, subsequent studies focusing on expense preference behavior in the bank-
ing industry, by Rhoades (1980), and Smirlock and Marshall (1983) found conflicting
evidence. Rhoades argued that Edward’s test was too limiting in just focusing on the
excess of labor and wages. Instead, Rhoades incorporated a greater number of variables
in Edward’s labor demand function, and used a much broader data set than previous
studies. Rhoades found no support for the expense preference hypothesis. Similarly,
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using data on the banking industry Smirlock and Marshall conclude that Edward’s test
was too narrow and also focused on a broader labor demand equation. After running
several hypothesis tests, Smirlock and Marshall reject the existence of expense prefer-
ence behavior in the banking industry. In a similar study, Awh and Primeaux Jr (1985)
applied an intercept test similar to Edward’s and came to the conclusion that there was
no evidence of expense preference behavior in the U.S. electricity industry. Likewise,
Blair and Placone (1988) found no evidence of expense preference behavior in the U.S.
savings and loans industry.
In a departure from Edward’s test, Mester (1989) derived a more general test
for expense preference. She argued that Edward’s intercept test would be valid only if
the firms in question all shared the same Cobb-Douglas type production function. So,
Mester derived a test that only took into account the firm’s cost function, and set out to
test for expense preference via an input specific parameter included in the cost function.
Applying this new general approach to the U.S. savings and loans industry, Mester found
no evidence of expense preference behavior, lending evidence to the results in Blair and
Placone (1988).
Following Mester, Dor, Duffy, and Wong (1997) studied whether hospitals that
became contract managed, during a well-defined period, employed managers who used
more than the cost-minimizing amounts of labor and capital. Dor et al. added to
Mester’s framework by including the input demand functions in the estimation pro-
cedure. They found that expense preference behavior is present in contract managed
hospitals, but the behavior depends on the discretionary input being studied. A limit-
ing factor of Dor et al., however, is that the study was applied to a conditional sample
of U.S. hospitals; only those hospitals that adopted third-party contract management
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agreements in the time period studied. Therefore, making cost comparisons with owner
controlled hospitals impossible.
This paper builds on Dor, et al. with an attempt to provide additional and recent
evidence to the presence of expense preference behavior in U.S. hospitals. In particular,
it adds a control group in order to make reasonable cost comparisons between hospitals
that contracted third-party management firms to run the day to day operations of the
hospitals and those hospitals that did not.
1.3 A Test for Expense-Preference Behavior
Firms in the industry produce a vector, y, of n outputs usingm inputs. A firm exhibiting
expense preference behavior prefers the first k inputs. The expense preferring manager
first selects the cost-minimizing level of output and inputs (xk+1, . . . , xm) from which she
does not derive any utility. Then, the expense preferring manager increases spending on
the inputs she prefers, the first k inputs (x1, . . . , xk), above their cost-minimizing levels.
Let, x∗ denote the cost-minimizing input level, while z denotes the expense preference
or inefficiency parameter (e.g. Edwards, 1977; Mester, 1989; Dor et al., 1997). So, the
expense-preferring firm demands x0i = (1 + zi)x∗i , i ∈ (1, . . . , k) of the preferred input,
and demands x∗j , j ∈ (k + 1, . . . ,m) of the cost-minimizing input.
6
The observed costs for the expense-preferring firm can then be written as,
C =
k∑
i=1
w∗i x
0
i +
m∑
j=k+1
w∗jxj
=
k∑
i=1
ziw
∗
i x
∗
i +
k∑
i=1
w∗i x
∗
i +
m∑
j=k+1
w∗jx
∗
j
=
k∑
i=1
ziw
∗
i x
∗
i + C
∗ (1.1)
where w∗ is a vector of exogenously determined input prices and C∗ is the cost-minimizing
cost level. Using the cost-minimizing cost share of input i, S∗i = w∗i x∗i /C∗, in (1.1) we
can write observed costs for the expense-preferring firm as,
C = C∗
(
1 +
k∑
i=1
ziS
∗
i
)
(1.2)
and using Shephard’s lemma, we have that the observed cost share is,
Si =
w∗i x
∗
i (1 + zi)
C
. (1.3)
Plugging (1.2) into (1.3) and rewriting, we have that the observed cost share is given by,
Si = S
∗
i
1 + zi
1 +
∑m
i=1 ziS
∗
i
. (1.4)
We can now see that if zi = 0, then C = C∗ and Si = S∗i and no expense preference
behavior occurs, i.e., the observed costs and observed input shares are equal to their
cost-minimizing values.
In modeling the cost function, the translog (dual) cost function is used. The
translog can be regarded as a quadratic approximation to the unspecified cost function
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and is a widely used functional form in the hospital efficiency literature (e.g. Vita, 1990;
Chirikos & Sear, 2000; Ludwig, Groot, & Van Merode, 2009). A general form translog
cost function is given by,
lnC =α0 + α1 ln y + α2 (ln y)
2 +
n∑
i=1
βi lnwi +
1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
βij lnwi lnwj
+
n∑
i=1
γi lnwi ln y, (1.5)
where C is total cost, y is output, and wi is the factor price of the ith input. From the
translog cost function and Shephard’s lemma, the share of input j in costs is given by,
Si =
∂ lnC
∂ lnwi
= βi + βii lnwi +
n∑
j 6=i
βji lnwj + γi ln y. (1.6)
Berndt and Christensen (1973) showed that estimating the full dual system (i.e., cost
and share equations together), via the method of seemingly unrelated regressions, leads
to much higher efficiency than just estimating the single cost function.
Using equations (1.5) and (1.6) along with equations (1.2) and (1.4) gives us the
following testable specification,
lnC = α0 + α1 ln y + α2 (ln y)
2 +
n∑
i=1
βi lnwi
+
1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
βij lnwi lnwj +
n∑
i=1
γi lnwi ln y
+ ln
[
1 +
n∑
i=1
zi
(
βi + βii lnwi +
n∑
j 6=i
βji lnwj + γi ln y
)]
(1.7)
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Si =
(1 + zi)
(
βi + βii lnwi +
∑n
j 6=i βji lnwj + γi ln y
)
1 +
∑n
i=1 zi
(
βi + βii lnwi +
∑n
j 6=i βji lnwj + γi ln y
) . (1.8)
Parameter estimates in the above system of equations can be obtained via the method
of iterative seemingly unrelated non-linear regressions (NLSUR). This method has been
shown to be equivalent to maximum likelihood estimation (Gallant, 1986). In estimating
this system of equations, the normal symmetry condition (βij = βji ∀ i, j) is imposed on
the coefficients. Furthermore, in order for the translog cost function to be homogeneous
of degree 1 in input prices the following restriction are also compulsory,
n∑
i=1
βi = 1,
n∑
i=1
βij = 0 for all j,
n∑
i=1
γi = 0.
Since the cost shares sum to unity, in estimating the system of equations one cost share
must be dropped to avoid a singular covariance matrix.
1.4 Data and Sample Creation
1.4.1 Data
The bulk of the data for this paper come by way of the American Hospital Association
(AHA) Annual Survey Database. The AHA database contains hospital specific data on
over 6,000 hospitals with variables covering organizational structure, personnel, hospital
facilities and services, and financial performance. My analysis uses data for the years
1984 to 2007. Patient case-mix data comes from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, and inflation data from the Bureau of Labor Statistic’s Hospital Producer Price
Index.
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The AHA reports total cost as a measure that incorporates all hospital operating
expenses, including interest and depreciation expenses. This variable was used as the
dependent variable representing total cost. Cost data in the survey is disaggregated
into labor costs and other costs. Thus, two inputs were used; labor and non-labor
(hereafter referred to as capital). Input prices were unfortunately not readily available
in the AHA survey data set, but, following previous studies using a similar data set,
reasonable measures were created. Wages, the measure of labor costs, was created by
dividing labor costs by full-time equivalent employees. While the rental rate of capital,
the measure of capital costs, was created by dividing capital costs by the total number
of hospital beds.
Since this study was not interested in looking at specific output inefficiencies, a
single output variable was chosen. Adjusted patient days, transforms outpatient services
into inpatient day unit equivalents via formula documented in the AHA codebook (e.g.,
see AHA Annual Survey Database Documentation), and takes into account total hospi-
tal output. Hospitals coordinate care for patients across many departments, including
intensive care units, emergency departments, surgical wards, and diagnostic services.
So, a control for differentiated product mix across hospitals was needed to account for
a varying hospital output. To control for product heterogeneity, the Medicare diagnosis
related group (DRG) case-mix index was added to the cost function along with patient
average length of stay. The DRG was used as it measures the complexity of both inpa-
tient stays and outpatient visits in such a way that can be aggregated into an index. In
addition to the case-mix index and average length of stay, other commonly used control
variables were included in the cost function (e.g. Vita, 1990; Dor et al., 1997; Li &
Rosenman, 2001); hospital size as determined by the number of hospital beds, whether
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the hospital is public or private, hospital profit status, whether or not the hospital was
part of a larger multi-system of hospitals, and a set of binaries to control for year of
observation.
1.4.2 Sample Creation
My study examines hospitals that made the transition from an owner controlled man-
agement system to contract management between 1984 and 2007. Since the goal of the
paper is to compare the estimates for both the hospitals that chose to outsource their
management and the hospitals that did not, two group samples were created; a treatment
group, and a control group. The treatment group of hospitals were those which went
from being conventionally managed to contract managed in the time frame under study.
A binary variable available in the AHA survey was used in selecting institutions that
made the transition from a conventional management system to contract management.
Given that both pre-contract management estimates and post-contract manage-
ment estimates were of interest, the treatment group was divided into two subsampless; a
pre-contract sample and a post-contract sample. The pre-contract samples include data
for the year falling two years before the year of adopting contract management. While
the post-contract samples include data for the year following two years after adoption of
contract management. A two year lag, before and after contract management, was used
in order to allow the effects of a change in management to fully appear in the data.
Hospitals with contracts shorter than three years were dropped from the samples,
along with hospitals with incomplete or missing data. In addition, given that specialty
hospitals and Federal hospitals produce different products, they too were dropped from
the samples.
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Institutions that adopted contract management differed from those that did not,
so a random selection of conventionally managed hospitals did not produce an ade-
quate match for the control group. Therefore, a control group of hospitals was selected
using the Mahalanobis matching propensity score (conditional treatment probability)
matching method, following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) and using the Stata match-
ing algorithm provided in Leuven and Sianesi (2003). Hospitals with similar adjusted
patient days, labor expenses, capital expenses, case-mix index, average patient length
of stay, government control, and profit status were used for each year as the main cri-
terion for the matching algorithm. The matching algorithm allowed for a selection of
non-adopters, the control group, that shared the same longitudinal distribution as the
treatment group. And just like the process for the treatment group, the control group
was divided into pre-contract and post-contract subsamples. Summary statistics for
both the treatment group and the control group can be found on the following page in
Table 1.1.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Definition Treatment Control
Pre Post Pre Post
Dependent
ln cost Total cost 16.22(1.29) 16.21(1.06) 16.21(1.31) 16.18(1.06)
share 1 Labor cost/TC 0.54(0.07) 0.52(0.06) 0.54(0.06) 0.55(0.07)
share 2 Capital cost/TC 0.45(0.08) 0.47(0.07) 0.45(0.06) 0.44(0.07)
Independent
ln y Adj. patient days 9.97(1.11) 9.88(1.01) 9.90(1.16) 9.82(0.97)
lnw1 Labor cost per FTE 10.31(0.29) 10.36(0.26) 10.32(0.29) 10.37(0.29)
lnw2 Capital cost per bed 11.09(0.79) 11.28(0.67) 11.14(0.72) 11.20(0.67)
cmi Medicare case-mix index 1.15(0.19) 1.12(0.15) 1.14(0.19) 1.12(0.13)
los Avg. length of stay 21.48(28.2) 21.77(30.3) 23.21(36.4) 26.99(58.14)
govt Govt control binary 0.43(0.50) 0.43(0.49) 0.45(0.50) 0.41(0.49)
nprof Nonprofit status binary 0.47(0.22) 0.51(0.24) 0.49(0.22) 0.53(0.25)
system System status binary 0.25(0.43) 0.31(0.47) 0.27(0.44) 0.31(0.46)
church Church operated binary 0.07(0.25) 0.04(0.19) 0.11(0.31) 0.08(0.27)
large >100 beds binary 0.37(0.48) 0.29(0.45) 0.34(0.48) 0.27(0.45)
n 886 664 875 657
Standard deviations in parentheses. All values in 1998 dollars.
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1.5 Estimation Results
Results for the estimation of the system of equations found in (1.7) and (1.8) were derived
via non-linear iterative seemingly unrelated regressions (ITSUR). Starting values were
obtained from the linear ITSUR model wherein the parameter zi is set to zero, with all
iterations taking 8-14 interactions to converge. Considering that all input shares add up
to one, one input demand equation must always be dropped to avoid multicollinearity.
Given the aforementioned and that no a priori assumption was made as to which input
would be the preferred input, the expense preference parameter was allowed to differ for
the two inputs. The first step in the estimating procedure was to include the labor share
equation in the cost function and drop the capital share equation. The process was then
repeated but with the capital share equation in the cost function and then dropping
the labor share equation. This procedure was followed for both the pre-contract and
post-contract samples for both the control group and the treatment group. Tables 1.2
and 1.3 report the full estimation results for the labor share equation and the capital
share equation, respectively.
Comparing the inefficiency results from Tables 1.2 and 1.3 it becomes apparent
that labor is the preferred input, with all inefficiency parameters greater than zero. For
contract adopters there was an 18% increase in labor inefficiency from the pre-contract
period to the post-contract period, z1 increased from 1.682 to 1.99. While for the control
group, there was a 97% increase in labor inefficiency between the pre-contract and post-
contract period, z1 increased from 2.815 to 5.57. For the control group in particular, the
increase in z1 indicates a strong propensity towards labor inputs.
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Table 1.2: Nonlinear ITSUR Regressions Results for ln Cost, Labor Share
Coefficient Variable Treatment Control
Pre Post Pre Post
α0 Constant 3.359(0.834) –2.983(1.367) 1.345(0.743) 1.244(1.35)
α1 ln y –0.536(0.173) 0.846(0.288) –0.090(0.150) –0.170(0.280)
α2 ln y · ln y 0.060(0.009) –0.013(0.015) 0.036(0.008) 0.040(0.015)
β1 lnw1 –0.054(0.095) 0.017(0.123) –0.166(0.076) –0.195(0.075)
β2 lnw2 1.054(0.096) 0.983(0.123) 1.166(0.076) 1.195(0.075)
β11 lnw1 · lnw1 0.055(0.006) 0.050(0.008) 0.046(0.006) 0.039(0.009)
β22 lnw2 · lnw2 0.018(0.005) 0.018(0.007) 0.001(0.004) 0.001(0.004)
β12 lnw1 · lnw2 –0.073(0.006) –0.068(0.009) –0.047(0.006) –0.040(0.009)
γ1 ln y · lnw1 0.005(0.003) –0.002(0.003) –0.003(0.002) –0.000(0.003)
γ2 ln y · lnw2 –0.005(0.003) 0.002(0.003) 0.003(0.002) 0.000(0.003)
δ1 cmi 0.612(0.098) 0.656(0.142) 0.777(0.107) 0.946(0.167)
δ2 los –0.006(0.001) –0.005(0.001) –0.004(0.000) –0.001(0.000)
δ3 govt 0.015(0.028) –0.032(0.034) –0.008(0.029) –0.018(0.037)
δ4 nprof –0.035(0.057) –0.050(0.071) –0.144(0.062) –0.062(0.069)
δ5 system 0.035(0.032) –0.016(0.038) –0.025(0.033) –0.010(0.040)
δ6 church 0.002(0.051) –0.006(0.085) 0.039(0.045) –0.009(0.067)
δ7 large 0.237(0.041) 0.368(0.057) 0.298(0.042) 0.314(0.059)
z1 1.682(0.460) 1.99(0.814) 2.815(0.728) 5.57(2.023)
n 886 664 875 657
Adj R2 (ln cost) 0.972 0.9534 0.970 0.9466
Adj R2 (ln share 1) 0.458 0.453 0.304 0.393
Standard errors in parentheses. All values in 1998 dollars.
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This is consistent with studies in the literature that find a direct correlation between
staffing level of nurses and health outcomes (e.g. Mobley & Magnussen, 2002; Mark,
Harless, & McCue, 2005; Kane, Shamliyan, Mueller, Duval, & Wilt, 2007). These results
lead one to the conclusion that absent contract adoption, the degree of labor inefficiency
would of have been more pronounce over the same time period.
Table (1.3) summarizes the results for the capital inefficiency parameter. Inter-
pretation of these results, however, needs to be treated with caution. The estimates
are a result of the aggregation of non-labor and “other” inputs that could not be readily
identified in the data. This was, as discussed in the previous section, due to the nature in
which the AHA survey presents the data. It is likely that some disaggregated categories
may have resulted in positive values for the inefficiency parameter.
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Table 1.3: Nonlinear ITSUR Regressions Results for ln Cost, Capital Share
Coefficient Variable Treatment Control
Pre Post Pre Post
α0 Constant 4.400(0.894) –2.282(1.405) 2.096(0.747) 2.298(1.362)
α1 ln y –0.584(0.179) 0.820(0.291) –0.102(0.149) –0.184(0.280)
α2 ln y · ln y 0.063(0.009) –0.012(0.016) 0.037(0.008) 0.041(0.015)
β1 lnw1 0.074(0.113) 0.310(0.140) 0.085(0.111) 0.074(0.133)
β2 lnw2 0.926(0.113) 0.690(0.140) 0.915(0.111) 0.926(0.133)
β11 lnw1 · lnw1 –0.089(0.012) –0.076(0.015) –0.085(0.012) –0.096(0.014)
β22 lnw2 · lnw2 –0.040(0.003) –0.040(0.003) –0.029(0.003) –0.036(0.004)
β12 lnw1 · lnw2 0.129(0.014) 0.116(0.017) 0.114(0.014) 0.132(0.017)
γ1 ln y · lnw1 –0.005(0.003) 0.001(0.004) 0.001(0.003) –0.001(0.004)
γ2 ln y · lnw2 0.005(0.003) –0.001(0.004) 0.001(0.003) 0.001(0.004)
δ1 cmi 0.571(0.098) 0.671(0.141) 0.793(0.102) 0.966(0.159)
δ2 los –0.005(0.001) –0.004(0.001) –0.004(0.000) –0.001(0.000)
δ3 govt 0.029(0.029) -0.038(0.035) –0.008(0.029) –0.015(0.037)
δ4 nprof 0.029(0.028) –0.045(0.071) –0.149(0.071) –0.080(0.069)
δ5 system –0.052(0.059) –0.019(0.038) –0.026(0.032) 0.001(0.040)
δ6 church 0.053(0.033) –0.007(0.087) 0.040(0.045) –0.006(0.067)
δ7 large –0.003(0.053) 0.347(0.058) 0.288(0.042) 0.316(0.059)
z2 –0.889(0.078) -0.212(0.097) -0.192(0.081) -0.354(0.082)
n 886 664 875 657
Adj R2 (ln cost) 0.971 0.953 0.972 0.946
Adj R2 (ln share 1) 0.467 0.456 0.283 0.415
Standard errors in parentheses. All values in 1998 dollars.
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1.6 Conclusion
Unlike previous studies, which focus on either an input-demand equation or the cost
function of the firm, this paper estimates the two jointly using a system of nonlin-
ear equations. Moreover, this paper addresses the longitudinal problem of institutions
adopting contract management in different years, present in previous studies, by creat-
ing a matched control group of non-adopters with the same longitudinal distribution as
the treatment group. Thus, this study was able to compare the inefficiency parameters
of institutions that outsourced their management with those institutions that did not.
The results of the estimation procedure finds that labor, and not capital, is the
preferred input in all U.S. hospitals regardless of managerial contract status. However,
institutions that adopt contract management benefit from lower labor inefficiencies than
the simulated non-contract adopters. These results suggest that while there is a propen-
sity towards expense preference in the labor input, contract managed firms are far more
efficient in the allocation of their inputs, in particular labor, than their owner controlled
counterparts. That is, subletting contracts to third-party managers is a way by which
owners, board of directors, or board of trustees can impose greater efficiencies and market
discipline on the institutions they control.
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CHAPTER 2
ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND SCOPE, AND RELATIVE COST EFFICIENCY OF
FLORIDA HOSPITALS
2.1 Introduction
The costs associated with operating a hospital in the state of Florida has been rising
to historically unprecedented levels. Over the last four decades the average annualized
growth rate of hospital spending has exceeded the growth rate of Florida’s Gross State
Product by a fairly large margin, 17.1%, see Figure 2.1. With hospitals facing ever
increasing costs, many to the point of insolvency – including one of the nation’s top
ranked trauma centers, Jackson Memorial Hospital – questions have been raised about
the future structure of the industry. State policy makers have been advocating the notion
that greater efficiency may be achieved through consolidations within the industry. As
a first step, in the search for cost cutting measures, a clear understanding of potential
production efficiencies faced by hospitals in the state is needed.
Two different production efficiencies may be achieved by hospitals in the state,
economies of scale and economies of scope. The presence of economies of scale means
that there are gains to efficiency by increasing hospital size, while economies of scope
means that gains to efficiency may be experienced by focusing on expanding a product
line. Economies of scale exist if production costs increase proportionally less than output
when there are increases to a hospital’s output mix. Economies of scope exist when two
or more products can be produced jointly at a lower cost than producing the products
separately.
The Florida hospital industry is greatly influenced by the presence and nature
of these production efficiencies. Do average costs decrease as hospitals increase their
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output? If so, then economies of scale are present and the industry will tend to be
made up of large institutions. These large institutions can produce their output at lower
average costs than smaller ones and therefore take advantage of the cost savings. Are
costs for Florida hospitals less when they provide a multitude of services, or is it less
costly for them to provide a few selective services? If economies of scope are present,
then the industry will potentially be made up of largely diversified institutions; if not,
then the industry will mostly be comprised of smaller more specialized hospitals. My
study will attempt to answer these questions by providing information on economies of
scale and scope, as well information on a measure of relative cost efficiencies for Florida
hospitals.
This paper continues as follows. The second section discusses the specification
of the multiproduct cost function along with describing the measures of economies of
scale, economies of scope, and relative cost efficiency. The third section describes the
data samples used in the study. The fourth, presents and reviews the empirical results.
While the fifth and final section summarizes the results and concludes the paper.
2.2 Estimating Efficiency
The production structure of the Florida hospital industry can be empirically studied
by estimating either a production function or a cost function. Direct estimation of the
production function is the most straightforward and attractive way to proceed. However,
the process of estimating the production function entails certain assumptions that are
not appropriate for to the hospital industry, in particular, that hospitals are free to
choose the level of output that maximizes their profits.
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Figure 2.1
Annualized Growth Rates of Florida’s Gross State
Product (GSP) and Hospital Costs (in 2005 dollars)
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000-2007 1970-2007
5%
10%
15%
Florida GSP
Florida Hospital Costs
12.2%
14.7%
10.9%
15.1%
6.4%
8.1%
6.7%
10.2%
9.2%
12.2%
Sources: Bureau of Economic Activity and American Hospital Association
Florida hospitals are required to provide emergency services to all that seek it and
as the need arises. With few exceptions, they have little to no control over the number
of illnesses they treat, nor the severity of such illnesses. They supply health services
as it is demanded. It is, then, reasonable to assume that the output mix that Florida
hospitals must contend with is not within their control and therefore exogenous. Florida
hospitals also compete, in the health service market, for factors of production. This
competition for inputs leads to the plausible assumption that, along with the output
mix, the factor prices Florida hospital face are also exogenous. This paper, therefore,
studies output efficiency via the dual of production, the cost function 1. Unlike the
1Duality theory shows that for every production function there is a corresponding or dual cost
function. See (Diewert, 1973) for more details.
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production function, which assumes that the firm has control over how much to produce
and what factor prices to pay, the cost function treats a firm’s output mix and input
prices as exogenous.
2.2.1 The Cost Function
In modelling hospital costs, the present study uses the Transcendental Logarithmic Cost
Function (translog). The translog cost function is a second-order Taylor approximation
to an arbitrary cost function that places no restrictions on substitutions between inputs
and allows economies of scale to vary with output (Caves, Christensen, & Tretheway,
1980). The translog estimated in this paper has the following form:
lnTC = α0 +
n∑
i=1
αi lnYi +
1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
αij lnYi lnYj +
m∑
k=1
βk lnWk
+
1
2
m∑
k=1
m∑
h=1
βkh lnWk lnWh +
n∑
i=1
m∑
k=1
δik lnYi lnWk + γX + ε, (2.1)
where TC is total cost, Yi is the ith output, Wk is the price of the kth factor input,
and X is a vector of other variables that have been shown, in the hospital literature, to
affect hospitals costs. When estimating the above cost function, the normal symmetry
conditions, αij = αji ∀ i, j and βhk = βkh ∀ h, k, are imposed in order to ensure
continuity in output and input prices. For the translog to behave according to general
economic principles, total cost must increase in proportion with increases in factor prices,
when output is held fixed. That is, in order for the translog to be a well behaved
cost function2, it must be linearly homogeneous in input prices (concave in Wk), and
increasing and continuous in output (Yi) and input prices (Wk). Therefore, the following
2For a more detailed description of the translog cost function see (Diewert, 1973).
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restrictions are imposed on equation (2.1):
m∑
k=1
βk = 1 (2.2)
m∑
k=1
βkh = 0 for all h (2.3)
n∑
i=1
δik = 0 for all i. (2.4)
By Shephard’s lemma (Shephard, 1953) the share of each input in cost can be
derived from the translog. The cost share of input h is derived as:
Sk =
∂ lnTC
∂ lnWk
= βk + βkk lnWk +
m∑
k 6=h
lnWk +
n∑
i=1
δik lnYi (2.5)
Since the cost share equations sum to unity, one cost share must be dropped in order to
avoid a singular covariance matrix. Estimating the full system, the translog cost function
along with the corresponding share equations, via the iterative seemingly unrelated
regression (ISUR) approach, yields much more robust estimates than just estimating
the cost function alone. It also addresses any problems that may arise with degrees of
freedom and small sample sizes (Berndt & Christensen, 1973).
2.2.2 Economies of Scale
For multi-output institutions, economies of scale can be subdivided into two types.
The first is known as overall or ray scale economies, while the second is known as
product-specific scale economies. Overall scale economies are present when a hospital’s
average total cost decreases as output increases while maintaining a consistent output
mix. Product-specific scale economies are present when the average total cost of a
specific output decreases as the production of that specific output increases.
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Overall scale economies are measured by calculating the inverse of the sum of
individual output cost elasticities. Following Panzar and Willig (1977), overall scale
economies (OScale) can be derived as
OScale =
TC(Y,W )∑
i YiMCi
. =
1∑
i ηtc,yi
, (2.6)
where MCi is the marginal cost associated with the ith output, and ηtc,yi is the ith
output cost elasticity. For the multi-output translog cost function described in (2.1) the
overall scale measure is given by
OScale =
[
n∑
i=1
∂ lnTC
∂ lnYi
]−1
=
[
n∑
i=1
(
αi +
n∑
j=1
αij lnYj +
m∑
k=1
δik lnWk
)]−1
. (2.7)
The summation of the individual output cost elasticities is equivalent to the percent
change in total cost that is a result of a percent change in overall output. Hospitals ex-
hibit constant, increasing, or decreasing returns to scale when OScale is equal to, greater
than, or less than one. If constant returns to scale are present, then no production effi-
ciencies are being derived in the over-all output range. If increasing returns to scale are
present, then hospitals are enjoying production efficiencies in the over-all output range.
And, if decreasing returns to scale are exhibited, then over-all production efficiencies are
not being realized.
The measurement of ray scale economies is ideal for understanding the efficiencies
being realized by the over-all output mix, but in order to get a more detailed view of
the production efficiencies of each individual output, a measurement of product-specific
scale is employed. Product-specific scale economies measure how the change in a specific
output, while holding the remaining output mix constant, affects cost. Product-specific
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scale economies exist if the average cost of a specific output decreases as the production
of that output increases. Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982) derived a measure for
product-specific scale economies for good i (PScalei) as
PScalei =
ICi(Y,W )
YiMCi
=
ICi(Y,W )
/
TC
ηtc,yi
, (2.8)
where ICi is the incremental cost of the ith output. Incremental cost can be calculated as
the difference in total costs when the firm produces a given level of output i while keeping
the remaining output mix constant (Baumol et al., 1982), ICi = TC(Y1, . . . , Yn,W ) −
TC(Y1, . . . , Yi−1, 0, Yi+1, . . . , Yn,W ).
Measuring product-specific scale economies with equation (2.8) requires the cal-
culation of the total cost function at zero output levels. The calculation of (2.1) at zero
output levels is infeasible given the nature of hospital output, i.e., hospitals have little to
no control over the output mix that is produced. However, a work around method has
been proposed by Kim (1986). The problem associated with the calculation of incremen-
tal costs can be resolved by using a reference point, with the suggested reference point
being ten percent of the sample mean outputs. Following (Kim, 1986), product-specific
scale economies for the translog cost function, at the approximation point, can then be
derived as
PScalei =
exp (α0)− exp
(
α0 + αi ln z + 1
/
2 αii(ln z)
2
)
αi exp (α0)
. (2.9)
Given that both the dependent and independent variables of the cost function are in
natural logarithms, and that ln = 0 is not defined, the suggested ten percent, z = 0.1,
of the sample means is used in place of the zero output levels.
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Additionally, product-specific scale economies between a set of outputs (PScaleij)
can be calculated, at the approximation point, as,
PScaleij =
exp (α0)− exp
[
α0 + αi ln z + αj ln z + 1
/
2 αii(ln z)
2 + 1
/
2 αjj(ln z)
2
]
(αi + αj) exp (α0)
.
(2.10)
Product-specific scale economies between sets of output measures whether or not cost
savings can be had by increasing only a given set of products.
2.2.3 Economies of Scope
Just like with scale economies, there are two types of scope economies that can be
calculated for multi-output institutions: overall scope economies, and product-specific
scope economies. Overall scope economies arise if the total cost associated with the joint
production of all the products in the output mix are less than the sum of the costs of
producing each product separately. While product-specific economies of scope exist if
the cost associated with the addition of a specific product to the output mix is lower
than the cost of producing that product alone.
Following Panzar and Willig (1977) overall scope economies (OScope), for the
multi-product firm can be calculated as
OScope =
∑n
i=1 TCi(Y,W )− TC(Y,W )
TC(Y,W )
, (2.11)
where TCi(Y,W ) is the total cost associated with the production of the specific output
Yi. If OScope is greater than zero, then hospitals are experiencing cost savings that
result from the joint production of their output mix, thereby exhibiting overall scope
economies.
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If OScope is less than zero, then hospitals are experiencing overall diseconomies of scope
and are incurring increased costs that are a result from the joint production of the
output-mix.
Product-specific scope economies are present when the joint production of an out-
put, along with the existing output mix, is less costly than independently producing the
output alone. According to Kim (1986) product-specific economies of scope (PScopei),
for the translog cost function at the point of approximation, for a product Yi is given by
PScopei =
exp
(
α0 +
∑
j 6=i αj ln z + 1
/
2
∑
j 6=i αjj(ln z)
2
)
exp (α0)
+
exp
(
α0 + αi ln z + 1
/
2αii(ln z)
2
)− exp (α0)
exp (α0)
. (2.12)
A PScopei value greater than zero indicates the existence of product-specific scope
economies for the ith output. Meaning that the firm is experiencing cost savings due to
the joint production of the ith output along with the existing output mix. If PScopei
yields a value less than zero, then the firm is exhibiting diseconomies of product-specific
scope. That is, the firm is incurring higher costs by jointly producing the ith product
with the remaining output mix.
2.2.4 Relative Cost Efficiency
When a hospital is technically efficient it means that it is deriving the maximum output
from its inputs. In order to derive a general sense of a hospital’s technical efficiency,
when estimating the relationship between total cost and outputs, this study estimates
the translog cost function via the stochastic frontier approach (SFA). Estimation of
the translog via SFA is particularly attractive as it has been shown that the method
tends to explain the true structure of cost reasonably well (Worthington, 2004). Unlike
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estimation of the cost function via ISUR, SFA focuses on the residual deviation between
a hospital’s true cost and the predicted costs.
Stochastic frontier analysis separates the error term from the regression into a
stochastic component and an efficiency component (Jondrow et al., 1982). So, the error
term in Equation (2.1) takes the form
ε = v + u, (2.13)
where v represents the stochastic component of the regression, which is assumed to be
an independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) normal variable with a mean of
zero and variance σ2; and, u is the inefficiency component, which is assumed to have a
strictly non-negative i.i.d. half-normal distribution. The inefficiency component shows
panel-specific effects and is modelled as a truncated-normal random variable which is
multiplied by a function of time,
u = γtu = {exp [−γ(t− T )]}u, (2.14)
where γ is an unknown scalar paramater at the tth period of observation over T time
periods (Battese & Coelli, 1992). Equation (2.14) is such that the inefficiency component
increases, decreases, or remains constant as t increases. That is, the exponentional
specification constrains, over time, the inefficiency component to either decrease at an
increasing rate, increase at a decreasing rate, or remain constant when γ > 0, γ < 0, or
γ = 0, respectively. So, when γ is positive hospital inefficiency can be assumed to be
decreasing.
Once the coefficients of the translog are estimated, a technical inefficiency score
is calculated. The inefficiency component is interpreted as the percentage difference
33
between actual observed hospital costs and the minimum costs represented by the best-
practice cost frontier.3 The best-practices cost frontier, determined by the other hospitals
in the sample, represents the minimum feasible cost given the inputs being employed in
the industry.
2.3 Data
The majority of the data used in this analysis come from the American Hospital Associa-
tion (AHA) Annual Survey Database and the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) Cost Reports. The patient case-mix data comes from the Center for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS). While the Hospital Producer Price Index comes by way
of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The sample is made up of an unbalanced panel of 181 short-term care hospitals
from the state of Florida, for the period of 1998 through 2007, consisting of 1725 ob-
servations. The dependent variable of total cost (TC) is made up of total operating
expenses, including interest and depreciation. Three main output variables were used
in the analysis; inpatient admissions, emergency room visits, and outpatient visits. In-
patient admissions (Y1) report the total number of acute and intensive care patients
admitted to the hospital. Emergency room visits (Y2) consist of the number of patients
admitted through the hospital’s emergency room.
3For more information on SFA see (Kumbhakar, Kumbhakar, & Lovell, 2003).
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Table 2.1
Summary Statistics
Standard
Variable Description Mean deviation
Dependent
TC Total cost (000 dollars) 117,952 141,636
Independent
Y1 Inpatient admissions 97,847 72,844
Y2 Emergency visits 39,185 42,756
Y3 Outpatient visits 25,260 26,338
W1 Labor costs 55,668 14,742
W2 Capital costs 232,760 112,765
Explanatory
DRG DRG Case-mix index 1.40 0.238
GOV Govt binary 0.09 0.296
NPROF Non-profit binary 0.51 0.500
SY S System binary 0.57 0.495
Values in 2005 dollars.
Outpatient visits (Y3) report the number of same day, non-emergency, patient proce-
dures. Input prices were not readily available in any of the data sets so, following
previous studies, reasonable measures were constructed. The price of labor (W1) was
created by dividing total labor costs by the number of full-time equivalent employees.
The price of capital inputs (W2), i.e., drugs, medical supplies, materials, utilities, capital
stock and the book value of land, was created by dividing the cost of capital by the total
number of facility beds. All cost measures along with input prices and other monetary
values are expressed in 2005 dollars.
In order to account for product heterogeneity, the CMS diagnostic related group
(DRG) case-mix index was added to the cost function. The DRG case-mix measures, on
a per unit basis, the severity of inpatient care, emergency room visits, and outpatient
visits in such a way that can be aggregated into an index representing the overall severity
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of health service demanded. In addition to the DRG case-mix index, commonly used
variables, which have been shown to explain variation in hospital costs, have been added
to the cost function (e.g. Vita, 1990; Dor et al., 1997; Li & Rosenman, 2001). Binary
variables indicating whether a hospital was a member of a multi hospital system (SY S),
whether it was organized as a non-profit (NPROF ), and whether the hospital was
government operated (GOV ) were added. Table 2.1 contains a summary of the variables
along with descriptive statistics.
2.4 Empirical Results
The SFA results of the translog cost function were derived using the xtfrontier routine
in STATA 11. All models converged after 21 iterations.
2.4.1 Cost Function Results
Table 2.2 presents SFA estimates of the translog cost function coefficients, by hospital
size, for the state of Florida. Using the definition of hospital size provided by Preyra and
Pink (2006), the sample was partitioned into three groups: (1) small hospitals consisting
of institutions with fewer than 100 hospital beds; (2) medium sized hospitals consisting
of hospitals that have more than 100 beds but fewer than 300; and, (3) large hospitals
consisting of institutions that have 300 or more beds. With the exception of the labor
cost coefficient for large hospitals, the estimated results with respect to the outputs
(αi’s), input prices (βk’s), and treatment complexity mix (cmi) take on plausible values.
As expected, regardless of hospital size, the leading output contributing the most
to a hospital’s cost is inpatient care, followed by emergency room service, then by out-
patient visits. The labor component contributes the most to overall hospital costs, for
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small and medium sized hospitals. Capital costs, however, is bigger than expected for
large institutions, and is significantly larger than the capital cost faced by medium and
small sized hospitals. In return, the labor cost component for large institutions is neg-
ative, which is not reasonable. This result may be related to the inability of flexible
form cost functions, such as the translog, to accurately represent a firm’s technology for
outputs that are far from the point of approximation (Wales, 1977).
Flexibility is the notion that the functional form of the cost function places no
restrictions on the substitution and scale elasticities of a firm’s inputs; it is a local
property. It is not a global property and thus flexible form cost functions may perform
poorly for data points far from the mean (Caves & Christensen, 1980). That is, the
translog is able to match the first and second derivatives of an arbitraty cost function at
a given point, generally at the sample means. But, the translog may be a poor indicator
of the unknown true cost function at distances far from the sample means.
This may very well be the case in this instance, since there is no upper bound
restriction in the number of beds that make up the sample group of large hospitals. Of
the 594 observations in the sample of large hospitals, 217 have capital cost, per bed,
in excess of $432,000. Which is almost two standard deviations larger than the group’s
mean capital cost of $255,360 per bed. However, regardless of the limitations of flexible
functional form cost functions, the translog cost function still provides insight into the
behavior of an institution’s costs. In particular, the degree of scale and scope economies
exhibited by hospitals. The results reported here are local estimates, not global, meaning
that they are valid for small changes in output near the point of approximation and may
not hold for very large changes or deviations in output.
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Table 2.2
SFA Results
Coefficient Variable Results
Small Medium Large
Constant α0 2.085(1.842) 16.69(2.012) 18.64(2.051)
lnY1 α1 0.490(0.139) 0.579(0.079) 0.635(0.273)
lnY2 α2 0.239(0.116) 0.278(0.042) 0.369(0.081)
lnY3 α3 0.186(0.056) 0.208(0.029) 0.249(0.113)
lnY1 · lnY1 α11 0.006(0.007) 0.007(0.026) -0.013(0.026)
lnY1 · lnY2 α12 0.105(0.041) 0.028(0.026) 0.047(0.027)
lnY1 · lnY3 α13 -0.146(0.044) -0.030(0.029) -0.002(0.031)
lnY2 · lnY2 α22 0.027(0.029) 0.093(0.029) 0.127(0.028)
lnY2 · lnY3 α23 0.001(0.024) 0.013(0.024) -0.159(0.029)
lnY3 · lnY3 α33 0.076(0.018) 0.146(0.029) 0.366(0.047)
lnW1 β1 0.560(0.131) 0.591(0.083) -0.182(0.091)
lnW2 β2 0.441(0.131) 0.409(0.083) 1.182(0.091)
lnW1 · lnW1 β11 0.019(0.013) 0.020(0.007) 0.050(0.007)
lnW1 · lnW2 β12 -0.027(0.004) -0.038(0.003) -0.003(0.002)
lnW2 · lnW2 β22 0.008(0.013) 0.018(0.007) -0.046(0.008)
lnY1 · lnW1 δ11 0.015(0.005) 0.021(0.003) 0.004(0.004)
lnY1 · lnW2 δ12 0.080(0.017) 0.212(0.022) -0.039(0.018)
lnY2 · lnW1 δ21 0.009(0.006) 0.001(0.004) 0.008(0.004)
lnY2 · lnW2 δ22 -0.150(0.032) -0.339(0.032) 0.216(0.034)
lnY3 · lnW1 δ31 -0.018(0.006) -0.010(0.004) 0.003(0.005)
lnY3 · lnW2 δ32 0.064(0.033) 0.115(0.029) -0.192(0.033)
DRG γ1 0.446(0.086) 0.266(0.038) 0.227(0.031)
GOV γ2 0.133(0.037) 0.009(0.022) -0.034(0.017)
NPROF γ3 -0.032(0.025) 0.048(0.013) 0.111(0.014)
SY S γ4 -0.025(0.024) 0.008(0.012) 0.007(0.012)
N 342 805 578
Standard errors in parentheses.
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2.4.2 Economies of Scale Results
The first step in determining if there are any potential gains to production efficiency for
Florida hospitals is to look at economies of scale. From the stochastic frontier results
of the translog cost function, overall scale economies were derived using Equation (2.7).
The result are presented below in Table 2.3 along with their standard errors.4
Table 2.3
Scale economies∗
Small 1.113 (0.014)
Medium 0.963 (0.008)
Large 0.839 (0.006)
All 0.948 (0.008)
∗ Mean values derived via Equation (2.7). Values greater than, equal to, or
less than one indicate increasing, constant, or decreasing returns to scale.
The results show that, on average, only small sized institutions enjoy gains from
overall scale economies; while, medium and large sized hospitals exhibit diseconomies
of scale. It is curious to note that even though medium sized institutions exhibit dis-
ceconomies of scale, they are very close to the point of constant returns. That is to
say, small hospitals enjoy overall production efficiencies, while large hospitals, and to a
lesser extent, medium sized hospitals, are not enjoying efficiency gains from their overall
output. As a whole, the results suggests that, for the state of Florida, as hospital size
increases the gains from overall scale economies decreases.
4The results were derived from the predicted economies of scale function along with the data. Thus,
the results are vectorized over the observations and are not scalars. The standard errors were generated
by the statistical software, Stata, using the predictnl command which uses the delta method in deriving
the test statistics. For more information see the Stata 11 Base Reference Manual.
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Point estimates of product-specific scale economies for both single outputs and
combinations of outputs are presented in Table 2.4. Given that the measurement of in-
cremental cost is not feasible, as detailed in the section of the text dealing with economies
of scale, only point estimates are presented. Therefore, no standard errors are reported
in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4
Product-specific scale economies at point of estimation∗
Y1 – Inpatient admissions 1.397
Y2 – Emergency visits 1.450
Y3 – Outpatient visits 1.129
Y1 and Y2 1.009
Y1 and Y3 1.052
Y2 and Y3 1.082
∗ Point of approximation values derived via Equations (2.9) and (2.10). Values
greater than one indicate that economies of scale are present.
Product-specific scale economies are present for all three outputs. With emer-
gency room visits and inpatient admissions, 1.450 and 1.397 respectively, being larger
than outpatient visits, 1.129. While hospitals as a whole exhibit product-specific scale
economies, we would have expected them to have more control over the average costs
associated with outpatient visits, as outpatient procedures are generally scheduled and
can be planned for in advance, unlike emergency room visits and most inpatient admis-
sions. The results suggests that hospitals have focused on achieving cost efficiencies on
the outputs which contribute the most to costs but are the most stochastic. Florida
hospitals can then obtain greater output efficiencies and therby greater cost savings by
the expansion of emergency room visits and inpatient admissions.
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Product-specific scale economies associated with the combined output groups
reveals that hospitals in the state are enjoying a little more than constant returns to scale
in all combinations of product sets. With the product sets that include outpatient visits
providing the most gains in cost efficiencies; 1.082 for emergency room visits combined
with outpatient visits, 1.052 for inpatient admissions combined with outpatient visits,
and 1.009 for inpatient admissions combined with emergency room visits.
Hospitals exhibit overall diseconomies of scale while enjoying product-specific
scale economies. This is because of the fact that the measurement of product-specific
scale economies only takes into account the cost associated with the output being con-
sidered. So, if hospitals produced solely one ouput, say inpatient admissions, then
economies of scale, of magnitude 1.397, would be present. However, hospitals are mul-
tiproduct institutions and as such produce mutliple outputs simultaneously. It is in
the production of multiple outputs that Flodia hospitals, as a whole, experience overall
disceonomies of scale.
2.4.3 Economies of Scope Results
Results on scope economies are presented in Table 2.5. All three partitioned groups
enjoy the presence of overall scope economies. Large hospitals experience particularly
pronounced economies of scope of 2.186, followed by medium-sized hospitals at 1.869.
Small hospitals enjoy the least gains from expanding scope, at 1.421. The results on
overall scope economies can be interpreted as the percentage difference between the
cost associated with joint production and the cost associated of producing each output
seperately. That is, the value of overall economies of scope of 1.421 for small hospitals
means that it would cost small hospitals, on average, 142.1 percent more to produce the
outputs seperately rather than jointly.
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Table 2.5
Scope economies∗
Small 1.421 (0.032)
Medium 1.869 (0.012)
Large 2.186 (0.063)
All 1.732 (0.033)
∗ Mean values derived via Equation (2.11). Values greater than zero indicate
the existence of scope economies. Standard errors in parentheses.
The results reported imply that small Florida hospitals benefit the least from out-
put diversification, while large hospitals benefit the most. The results suggest that small
hospitals can benefit more, relative to larger institutions, from focusing on expanding
the scale of production rather than diversifying their product mix. The opposite is true
for large hospitals, they can benefit by continuing to expand and diversify the services
they provide.
Table 2.6
Product-specific scope economies at point of estimation∗
Y1 – Inpatient admissions 0.302
Y2 – Emergency visits 0.270
Y3 – Outpatient visits 0.318
∗ Point of approximation values derived via Equation (2.12). Values greater
than zero indicate that product specific economies of scope are present.
Point estimates of product-specific scope economies are reported in Table 2.6. All
values are positive giving rise to the existence of product-specific economies of scope.
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Evidently, Florida hospitals enjoy cost savings due to the joint production of each output
along with the remaining output mix, rather than the production of each output separate
and apart from the rest of the output mix.
2.4.4 Relative Cost Efficiency Results
The results presented in this section report an inefficiency score that is derived as the per-
centage difference between the actual observed hospital cost and the minimum feasible
cost, or the frontier created statistically from the samples. The estimation of the translog
cost function via SFA creates an inefficiency score for each observation in the samples.
Table 2.7 presents the average inefficiency scores of the three partitioned Florida hospital
groups, along with the average inefficiency score for all Florida hospitals. The inefficiency
results indicate the existence of inefficiencies across all Florida hospitals regardless of
size. The inefficiency score of 0.289, for “All”, indicates that Florida hospital output
is being produced at a cost inefficiency of 28.9%. That is, Florida hospitals, on aver-
age, are producing at a cost that is 28.9% higher than hospitals employing best practices.
Table 2.7
SFA inefficiency scores ∗
Small 0.171 (0.048)
Medium 0.308 (0.087)
Large 0.359 (0.072)
All 0.289 (0.055)
∗ Mean values reported with standard errors in parentheses.
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From the inefficiency results we conclude that large institutions are the most
inefficient, producing at a cost that is 35.9% higher than that of large hospitals employing
best practices. Medium sized hospitals, on average, are operating at a cost that is 30.8%
higher than their best practices, same sized, counterparts. Small hospitals are the least
inefficient, operating on average at a cost that is 17.1% higher than the small hospitals
operating at the minimum feasible cost frontier.
2.5 Conclusion
The assumption that efficiency gains can be readily had by consolidating smaller firms
into larger institutions does not necessarily hold for the Florida hospital industry. This
paper analyzed output and cost efficiencies for Florida hospitals over the period between
1998 and 2007. When comparing the output efficiency results with those of relative cost
efficiency, some tentative conclusions can be drawn.
First, the empirical evidence supports the conclusion that only small sized hos-
pitals in the state, those with fewer than 100 beds, enjoy overall economies of scale.
The same evidence also suggests that medium and large hospitals exhibit diseconomies
of scale. Albeit, medium sized institutions are very close to enjoying constant returns
to scale. Second, the empirical evidence suggests that, regardless of size, all Florida
hospitals, on average, enjoy significant overall scope economies. Larger institutions eno-
joy the greatest benefits from product diversification, followed by medium, and then
by small, sized hospitals. Third, the empirical evidence also supports the conclusion
that, on average, all Florida hospitals enjoy costs savings due to the joint production of
output. Finally, small hospitals, which enjoy the highest levels of overall economies of
scale, also are the institutions operating closest to the minimum cost frontier.
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From a policy perspective, the lack of a cost advantage for large diversified hos-
pitals implies that the industry appears to be in no danger of being dominated by a
few large firms. Policy choices that can help the process of consolidation, especially
between relatively small hospitals, may be desirable. Smaller hospitals appear to stay
competitive by operating closer to the efficient frontier. These smaller hospitals can then
improve output efficiency by expanding their scale of production or merging with other
institutions. Even though there is a threat that smaller hospitals can and may be taken
over by larger more diversified firms, the evidence suggests that there is opportunity for
smaller and less diversified hospitals to operate efficiently. To conclude, the results have
shown that policy should be geared towards increasing scale for institutions with fewer
beds and towards facilitating multiproduct production in larger institutions.
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CHAPTER 3
EFFICIENCY OF FLORIDA HOSPITALS: A DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS
APPROACH
3.1 Introduction
In spite of continued efforts to curb health spending, healthcare costs in the United
States continue to rise. According to a recent publication by the National Center for
Health Statistics, health expenditures totaled $2.3 trillion and accounted for 16% of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2008, compared to $1.3 trillion and 13.6% of GDP in
2000 (National Center for Health Statistics, 2010). Furthermore, during the same period
real per capita spending on hospital care rose by approximately 68%. It is believed that a
large contributing factor associated with the rising cost of hospital care is the inefficiency
of health care institutions (Worthington, 2004). Having a clear understanding of the
causes of hospital inefficiency, along with the inputs of production, and environmental
factors that lead to those inefficiencies is of central importance to the managers of
healthcare establishments. It is particularly important when they are making policy
and budgeting decisions that will affect their institutions.
Efficiency analysis can be an extremely helpful tool for decision makers that al-
lows for a better understanding of the performance of the health care institutions under
their control. The primary aim of this study is, therefore, to measure hospital efficiency
in the state of Florida by applying a nonparametric empirical approach, known as Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), in order to derive relative efficiency scores for each hospi-
tal. Data Envelopment Analysis allows the identification of hospitals that are inefficient
relative to their peers and report by how much their inefficiencies differ. Additionally,
the approach taken in this study will identify the factors of production that hospitals
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are over utilizing and that are causing added inefficiencies. This analysis will help man-
agers to directly target those specific inputs when trying to improve their institution’s
performance. Finally, I will identify structural, managerial, and environmental factors
that lead to improved efficiency results.
The present paper continues as follows. The second section discusses the two
stage approach and the models used in each stage. The third section describes the data
and the variables used in the study. The fourth section presents and reviews the empirical
results from each stage of the analysis, with the fifth and final section summarizing the
results and concluding the paper.
3.2 Methodology for Estimating Efficiency
In this paper a two-stage approach is used to analyze a hospital’s overall technical
efficiency and the factors that may explain variations therein. The first stage uses the
Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984) (BCC) DEA model in order to derive a technical
efficiency score, from a set of inputs and outputs, for each non-specialty hospital in
the state of Florida. In addition to the individual efficiency scores, in the first stage
the amount of input over utilization (inputs slacks) associated with each hospital are
calculated. The second stage involves regressing the efficiency score generated in the
first step on a number of structural, managerial, and environmental factors that may
have an impact on the efficiency of Florida hospitals via a Tobit regression model.
3.2.1 Data Envelopment Analysis
Data Envelopment Analysis is a nonparametric method for measuring the overall tech-
nical efficiency of a decision making unit (DMU), in this case Florida hospitals. It
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constructs a production frontier from the data set based on the best observed practices.
The DEA approach is a nonparametric technique based on linear programming. Being
nonparametric makes DEA highly attractive for measuring hospital efficiency. The hos-
pital industry is one of the very few markets where not-for-profit, for-profit, church and
government owned institutions produce similar outputs simultaneously. Unlike para-
metric methods of estimating a one-size-fits-all production, or cost, function in order to
measure efficiency, DEA constructs a linear-segmented piece-wise production frontier,
from the available data, without making any assumptions about the underlying produc-
tion technology. This frees the DEA results from any sort of error due to misspecification
of the production technology1.
In DEA, technical efficiency is defined as the ratio of the weighted sum of a
DMU’s outputs to the weighted sum of its inputs. Assuming convexity of production
possibility sets, technical efficiency is then derived by solving the following mathematical
programming problem for each DMU,
max
u,v

S∑
s=1
usysi
M∑
m=1
vmxmi
 (3.1)
1A full and comprehensive treatment of DEA can be found in Fare and Knox Lovell (1978); Fare,
Grosskopf, and Lovell (2008); Lovell et al. (1994); Charnes (1994); Coelli, Rao, and Battese (1998);
Cooper, Seiford, and Tone (2000).
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subject to:
S∑
s=1
usysj
M∑
m=1
vmxmj
≤ 1, j = 1, . . . , I
us, vm ≥ 0
where ysi is the quantity of output s for DMUi, us is a positive weight associated with
output ys, xmi is the quantity of input xm for DMUi, and vm is a positive weight asso-
ciated with input xm.
If we let the M inputs and S outputs for the ith DMU be represented by the
column vectors xi and yi, respectively; the formulation in (3.1) can be more succinctly
written as,
max
u,v
(
u′yi
v′xi
)
, (3.2)
subject to:
u′yj
v′xj
≤ 1, j = 1, . . . , I
u,v ≥ 0.
Intuitively, the mathematical programming problem in (3.2) seeks to find the
output and input weights that maximize the efficiency of the ith DMU, relative to all
its peers, with the constraints that the maximum efficiency any DMU may attain is
equal to one. The optimal weights are computed for each DMU and are calculated in
order to maximize a DMU’s weighted output-input ratio. However, a problem with the
formulation in (3.2) is that there are an infinite number of solutions (Coelli et al., 1998).
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If (u∗,v∗) is a solution to the mathematical programming problem, then (αu∗, αv∗), for
any positive value of α, must also be a solution. In order to overcome this issue either
the numerator or the denominator must be restricted to equal to one (Cooper et al.,
2000). Thus, the problem becomes to either maximize the weighted outputs subject to
the weighted inputs being equal to one, or to minimize the weighted inputs subject to
the weighted outputs being equal to one.
According to Coelli et al. (1998) the problem of multiple solutions can be over-
come by rewriting the mathematical programing problem in multiplier form, as opposed
to ratio form, as follows
max
µ,ν
(µ′yi) , (3.3)
subject to:
ν ′xj = 1,
µ′yj − ν ′xj ≤ 0, j = 1, . . . , I,
µ, ν ≥ 0,
where u and v have been replaced with µ and ν in order to emphasize that the math-
ematical programming problem has changed. The maximization problem in (3.3), sets
out to measure efficiency by maximizing the output given the level of inputs a DMU
employs. However, hospitals are not free to choose the level of output they produce.
Florida hospitals are required to provide emergency services to all that seek it and as
the need arises. With few exceptions, they have little to no control over the number of
illnesses they treat, nor the severity of such illnesses. They supply health services as it is
demanded. Therefore, this study is interested in the dual of the maximization problem
in (3.3). That is, we are interested in measuring efficiency by minimizing the amount of
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inputs a hospital employs given the level of outputs it produces. According to Coelli et
al. (1998), following the duality in linear programming, (3.3) can also be written as the
following minimization problem
min
θ,λ
θ, (3.4)
subject to:
− yi + λY ≥ 0,
− θxi −Xλ ≥ 0,
λ ≥ 1,
where θ is the efficiency component, λ is an a I × 1 vector of weights that is associated
with each specific DMU, X and Y are the input and output matrices representing the
data of all the DMUs.
The linear programming model in (3.4) is known as the input-oriented technical
efficiency DEA Model with variable returns to scale. The input-oriented DEA model
seeks optimal values for θ and λ that will radially contract the ith DMU’s input vector,
xi, while maintaining output constant. The input-oriented model in essence measures
by how much and to what extent it is possible for a DMU to reduce its inputs without
affecting the level of its outputs. The value of θ is the efficiency score obtained for the
ith DMU, with a value of one indicating a technically efficient point and thus a point
on the frontier. The linear programming problem must be solved for each DMU in the
sample in order to derive the value of θ for each hospital.
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Figure 3.1
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To illustrate, suppose there are four hospitals using two inputs, x1 and x2, in
order to produce one output y. Figure 3.12 shows that hospitals C and D form the
piece-wise linear isoquant that is the efficient production frontier. Hospitals A and B are
off the frontier and are thus inefficient. The efficiency measure can then be calculated for
hospital A as OA′/OA and for hospital B as OB′/OB. A point such as A′ is considered
to be Farrell-Efficient (Farrell, 1957). However, whether a point such as A′ is efficient is
questionable because the hospital at point A′ can further reduce its use of x2, by CA′, to
the level employed by hospital C. A situation like A′ occurs when there is the presence
2Figure 3.1 was adopted from Coelli et al. (1998) and Cooper et al. (2000) .
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of input slacks in the input constraint of the linear programming problem found in (3.4),
−θxi −Xλ 6= 0. A value greater than zero in the input slack represents the additional
amount by which a DMU can decrease its input after accounting for its inefficiency,
while producing the same level of output. A point such as B′, which is on the frontier
and exhibits zero input slack is known as being Koopmans-Efficient (Koopmans, 1951).
Both the value of overall technical efficiency, θ, and the corresponding input slacks are
derived and reported in this study.
3.2.2 Tobit Regression
In the second stage, a Tobit regression (Tobin, 1958) model is used in order to evaluate
the affect various structural, organizational, and environmental factors may have on the
overall technical efficiency of Florida hospitals. A Tobit regression model was selected
since the dependent variable of the regression, overall hospital technical efficiency which
reports values within the interval (0, 1], is censored from above. In this instance, using
an ordinary least square (OLS) regression was ruled out given that the results would
have been biased and inconsistent (Amemiya, 1973). The Tobit regression is specified
as follows
θi = β0 + β
′Z+ εi (3.5)
where θi is the relative overall technical efficiency score for the ith DMU, the β’s are
coefficient estimates for the numerous structural, organizational, and environmental fac-
tors, Z, thought to affect a hospital’s overall technical efficiency, and εi is a normally
distributed error term.
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3.3 Data
The data for this study were obtained from the American Hospital Association (AHA)
Annual Survey Database, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Cost Re-
ports, and the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for the year 2007. The
sample consists of all short-term care, non-specialty, hospitals for the state of Florida.
Focusing on a single state eliminates variation in the results from different state level
regulatory and economic factors. Additionally, the study excludes long-term care, psy-
chiatric care, and cancer centers from the sample and focuses solely on general acute
short-term care hospitals. Four output variables and four input variables are used in
the study, along with a range of variables that may help explain variation in hospital
efficiency.
Following previous studies (Cowing and Holtmann (1983); Grannemann, Brown,
and Pauly (1986); Hollingsworth and Parkin (1995)) hospital output is measured as an
array of outputs. Four separate intermediate outputs are considered in this study; acute
care (AC), intensive care (IC), surgeries (SU), and emergency care (EC). It must be
noted that these measures of output are a second-best alternative to the conceptually
ideal measure of improved health status. Unfortunately, a measurement of patient health
status is unavailable in the data. We have, however, focused on in-hospital care and the
most common outputs produced by hospitals. The acute care variable consists of short-
term medical treatment for patients having an illness or injury, it is measured in the
number of admissions. The intensive care variable is also measured in the number of
admissions, and accounts for the treatment of critically ill patients.
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Surgeries are counted as the number of inpatient and outpatient surgical operations
performed during the period under study. Finally, the emergency care variable consists
of all ambulatory outpatient visits and emergency room visits.
Inputs include the number of full-time equivalent physicians (DR), the number
of full-time equivalent licensed and registered nurses along with the number of nurses’
assistants (RN), the number full-time equivalent medical technicians (EM), and the
number of beds (BD). The physicians variable includes all residents plus all physicians
that are employed, associated, or affiliated with the hospital. The registered nurses
variables includes all the licensed practical nurses, registered nurses, and nurse assistants
employed by the the institution. The medical technicians variable is comprised of all
radiology, laboratory, pharmacy, respiratory technicians, and other medical personnel
employed at the hospital. Following previous studies (Fare, Grosskopf, Lindgren, &
Roos, 1992; Linna, 1998; Maniadakis, Hollingsworth, & Thanassoulis, 1999; Blank &
Valdmanis, 2010) the number of fully staffed beds is included as a proxy for the hospital’s
physical capital. Capital, particularly in the health care sector, is a notoriously difficult
variable to collect accurately. Since the number of fully staffed beds a hospital has
represents each hospital’s capacity, we will follow the current literature and allow it to
proxy each hospital’s level of capital.
The independent variables used in the Tobit regression analysis portion of this
study were chosen from previous research as factors that may possibly have an effect on
hospital efficiency. A hospital’s ownership structure along with other managerial and
environmental factors have been closely related to a hospital’s cost structure and have
been linked to overall inefficiencies in the hospital literature (Valdmanis, 1990; Chien,
Rohrer, Ludke, & Levitz, 1995; Wang, Ozcan, Wan, & Harrison, 1999; Chen, Hwang,
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& Shao, 2005). Namely, we look at the effect ownership status has on a hospital’s
overall efficiency; that is, whether structured as a for-profit or not-for-profit institution
(NPROF), being affiliated to a church (CHRCH), or whether being government operated
(GOVT) has any effect on a hospital’s overall efficiency measure. Managerial decisions
may also affect a hospital’s efficiency outcome. Managerial variables considered in this
study include: whether a hospital is contract-managed (MNGMT); whether it is a mem-
ber of a system of hospitals (SYSTM); whether it is a member of the Council of Teaching
Hospitals (TEACH); and whether it is a community hospital as defined by the Hospital
Association of America (CMNTY). Moreover, in order to account for output hetero-
geneity, variables for patient average length of stay (AVLOS) and the CMS’s diagnostic
related group (DRG) case-mix index (CMI) are also considered. Both the AVLOS and
CMI variables serve as proxies for the complexity of care each hospital provides. The
CMI measures, on a per unit basis, the severity of inpatient care, emergency room visits,
and outpatient visits in such a way that can be aggregated into an index representing the
overall severity of health services provided by a hospital; while, AVLOS represents the
average length of bed-days or the amount of factor resources consumed by longer-term
patients. Finally, we constructed a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to account for
the level of competition in a DMU’s county. Market share was computed as the ratio
between a hospital’s total admissions and the total hospital admissions in the county
of operation. The market share for each DMU was then squared and then summed in
order to create an index of competition for each county. Summary statistics, along with
a brief description of each variable, are reported in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1
Summary Statistics for all Non-Specialty Florida Hospitals
Standard
Variable Description Mean Deviation
Outputs
AC Acute care admissions 139,123 173,901
IC Intensive care admissions 1,162 1,888
SU Total surgeries 7,495 7,519
EC Emergency & ambulatory visits 65,191 77,296
Inputs
DR FTE physicians & residents 132 105
RN FTE nurses 505 513
EM FTE medical technicians & medical personnel 1158 1190
BD Total number of staffed beds 306 285
Explanatory variables
NPROF Not-for profit hospital 0.562 0.497
CHRCH Church operated hospital 0.057 0.238
GOVT Government controlled 0.173 0.376
MNGMT Contract managed hospital 0.0392 0.174
SYSTM Member of a system of hospitals 0.773 0.419
TEACH Teaching hospital 0.541 0.496
CMNTY Community hospital 0.943 0.603
AVLOS Average length of stay, in days 9.694 8.571
CMI Case-Mix index 1.395 0.258
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman index 0.347 0.291
N = 194
3.4 DEA Results
The DEA efficiency results measure each hospital’s performance relative to the best
practice frontier, which is constructed from the observations in the data. Therefore, all
the results in this study are relative measures and not absolute. Table 3.4 in section
3.7 presents, for all non-specialty Florida hospitals, the full results of overall technical
efficiency, θ, along with the corresponding input slacks, as derived from the linear pro-
gramming model in (3.4). The overall technical efficiency value reports how efficient
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a hospital is relative to its peers or the best practice frontier. The overall technical
inefficiency score indicates, in percentage terms, the amount by which each input can
be proportionally reduced, while keeping the level of outputs constant, in order to move
the DMU onto the production frontier. The input slacks, on the other hand, represent
sources of additional inefficiency to a DMU. Input slacks in the linear programming
problem in (3.4) indicate the additional amount by which inputs can be reduced after
moving onto the efficient production frontier. That is, input slacks that are greater than
zero represent the additional amount by which an individual input can be reduced after
eliminating overall technical inefficiency. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind,
when looking at the results, that a DMU is completely efficient only when θ equals
to 1 and the associated input slacks are all equal to 0, i.e., the DMU is Koopman’s-
Efficient (Koopmans, 1951). For example, DMU 14 has an efficiency score of 0.805.
This means that hospital 14 can reduce the use of all inputs by the amount of its ineffi-
ciency, 1− θ14 = 0.195, or 19.5%. Moreover, DMU 14 has positive slacks for the inputs
RN and EM. This means that not only can DMU 14 reduce the use of all it’s inputs by
19.5%, but it can also reduce the number of RNs it employs by 343 and the number of
EM’s by 86. That is, there is input over-utilization by DMU 14, relative to it’s peers,
of 19.5%, plus there is over-utilization of RNs and EMs by the amount of the overall
technical inefficiency plus the amount of each input slack.
Table 3.2 reports average technical efficiency and input slack results for all non-
specialty Florida hospitals by Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).
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Table 3.2
Mean Efficiency and Input Slack Results for all Non-Specialty Florida Hospitals, by MSA
Input Slacks
MSA θ BD DR RN EM
Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL 0.88(0.16) 6.29(10.27) 0.25(0.57) 0.22(0.49) 4.95(5.64)
Crestview-Fort Walton Beach-Destin, FL 0.90(0.19) 7.05(14.09) 3.81(6.86) 8.16(9.43) 8.29(16.58)
Delton-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL 0.82(0.17) 5.31(11.86) 1.24(1.71) 75.46(150.1) 40.43(56.35)
Gainesville, FL 0.92(0.12) 0.00(0.00) 5.74(9.95) 7.17(10.89) 0.00(0.00)
Jacksonville, FL 0.97(0.07) 5.35(11.02) 0.00(0.00) 24.55(48.72) 47.68(99.07)
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 0.90(0.15) 1.92(4.30) 0.00(0.00) 3.47(7.76) 6.57(14.68)
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL 0.85(0.15) 4.38(13.10) 4.43(22.44) 14.90(26.36) 28.55(79.45)
Naples-Marco Island, FL 0.98(0.03) 66.06(90.15) 0.00(0.00) 1.65(2.34) 3.45(4.89)
North Port-Bradenton-Sarasota, FL 0.86(0.19) 23.42(17.81) 0.00(0.00) 11.69(13.81) 10.69(16.61)
Ocala, FL 0.92(0.12) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00)
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL 0.87(0.13) 1.52(4.81) 0.00(0.00) 11.82(16.62) 23.88(38.62)
Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL 0.95(0.13) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00)
Palm Coast, FL 0.68(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 4.51(0.00)
Panama City-Lynn Haven-Panama City Beach, FL 0.95(0.08) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00)
Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent, FL 0.91(0.12) 10.60(16.86) 0.00(0.00) 2.29(6.05) 0.00(0.00)
Port St. Lucie, FL 0.96(0.07) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 44.22(76.59)
Punta Gorda, FL 0.68(0.14) 0.00(0.00) 0.86(0.91) 23.61(30.62) 0.00(0.00)
Sebastian-Vero Beach, FL 0.71(0.21) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 22.09(21.28) 0.00(0.00)
Tallahassee, FL 0.99(0.02) 15.17(21.46) 12.94(18.31) 13.10(18.52) 24.41(34.52)
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 0.81(0.14) 5.01(11.66) 8.49(29.21) 24.03(75.97) 6.67(14.53)
Non-MSA 0.89(0.15) 3.36(9.50) 0.09(0.26) 3.06(7.64) 11.64(38.49)
N = 194
Number of Koopmans-Efficient DMUs = 62
Standard deviations in parentheses
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3.5 Tobit Regression Results
Using the overall technical efficiency score derived from DEA, θ, as a dependent variable,
we use a Tobit model in order to understand the effects non-production factors may have
on a DMU’s overall efficiency. This second step is particularly important in order to
understand which factors may affect a hospital’s efficiency. For example, from Table
3.4, DMUs 79 and 94 have identical technical efficiency scores, θ79 = θ94 = 0.827. The
major source of inefficiency, however, for DMU 79 comes from the over utilization of
nurses, DMU 74’s input slack for RN is 83.7. By comparison, DMU 94 uses all its inputs
efficiently, all the input slacks associated with it are equal to zero. There are obvious
factors at work, in the above example, that are not explained by DEA. Thus, the purpose
of this second step is identify some of the structural, managerial, and environmental
factors that can influence a hospital’s overall technical efficiency.
Table 3.3 reports the results of the second stage Tobit regression. With the
exception of SYSTM, CMNTY, and AVLOS all independent variables are statistically
significant. The results indicate that a hospital’s ownership or organizational type has a
significant impact on a hospital’s overall technical efficiency. Hospitals that are not-for-
profit experience, on average, an overall efficiency scores that is .087 higher than for-profit
hospitals. Inversely, church (CHRCH) and government (GOVT) owned hospitals are less
technically efficient than hospitals that are not.
In line with the incentives literature (Baumol, 1957; Williamson, 1963; Becker,
1971), the results show that institutions whose management (MNGMT) is contracted
to third-party firms are less technically efficient than those institutions managed by
its own managers. The logic behind the theory is that third-party managers have a
preference for employing factors of production well above the cost minimizing level. That
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is, third-party managers are not driven by cost-minimization and the efficiencies that are
derived therefrom. The Tobit results indicate this very fact. Contract managed hospitals
experience lower efficiency scores, 0.148 less, than hospitals which do not outsource their
management.
Teaching hospitals often require more investment in capital and equipment for
teaching purposes and often take one more complicated and severe cases for instructional
purposes. The results for the TEACH coefficient reflect this fact. Teaching hospitals,
on average, are less technically efficient than non-teaching hospitals, by a magnitude of
0.236. Similarly, community (CMNTY) hospitals are less technically efficient than their
non-community peers.
The two variables chosen to account for product heterogeneity indicate that there
are small efficiency losses from treating more severe medical cases. It should be noted
that the average length of stay (AVLOS) variable, chosen as a measure of the proportion
of factor resources used by inpatients and thus as a proxy for case severity turns out to
be statistically insignificant. The case-mix index (CMI), which measures, on a per unit
basis, the severity of inpatient care, emergency room visits, and outpatient visits serves
as a proxy for overall severity of health services provided by the hospital. The results as
they relate to CMI indicate that hospitals with more severe cases experience a minimal
reduction, on average, in overall efficiency of 0.011.
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) accounts for the level of competition
in a hospital’s county of operation. The results, indicate that the higher the level of
concentration, or the less the competition a hospital faces, the higher the gains to overall
technical efficiency. That is, institutions that operate in higher concentrated counties
experience, on average, higher levels of overall technical efficiency.
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Table 3.3
Tobit Regression Results for Non-Specialty Florida Hospitals
Standard
Variable Coefficient Error
Constant 0.986∗∗∗ 0.089
NPROF 0.087∗∗ 0.034
CHRCH -0.109∗ 0.063
GOVT -0.045∗∗ 0.016
MNGMT -0.148∗∗ 0.057
SYSTM 0.020 0.034
TEACH -0.236∗∗∗ 0.030
CMNTY -0.005 0.043
AVLOS 0.001 0.002
CMI -0.011∗∗∗ 0.003
HHI 0.112∗∗ 0.059
∗p< 0.1, ∗∗p< 0.05, ∗∗∗p< 0.01
3.6 Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to introduce an approach that enables the measurement
of hospital efficiency by decision makers in order to evaluate the policy choices they
make with respect to their institutions. I employed this approach on a sample of Florida
hospitals in order to derive a technical efficiency score for each institution, and derived
over utilization rates for the factors of production being employed by each hospital. I
found that 112 Florida hospitals, from a sample of 194 observation, are operating away
from the efficient production frontier, while 132 hospitals exhibit factor over utilization.
Additionally, I regressed the relative overall efficiency score of each hospital on a number
of structural, managerial, and environmental factors in order to explain variations in
hospital efficiency. I found several factors that affect a hospital’s efficiency conditional
on its input mix, these include an institution’s for-profit status, external agency control,
teaching status, case-mix severity, and market competition. With additional and less
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aggregated data, the approach outlined in this paper can be expanded and built upon by
hospital managers to derive a complete analysis of their institution’s relative efficiency
and the factors of production that may need specific attention.
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3.7 Complete Results
Table 3.4
DEA Results for all Non-Specialty Florida Hospitals
Input Slacks
DMU θ BD DR RN EM
1 1.000 23.657 0.000 1.107 5.809
2 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 0.787 0.000 0.000 0.000 13.759
4 0.969 7.791 0.000 0.000 5.182
5 0.654 0.000 1.268 0.000 0.000
6 0.626 0.000 1.185 0.000 0.000
7 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
8 1.000 28.181 0.000 15.709 33.164
9 0.993 0.000 14.063 16.913 0.000
10 0.681 0.000 2.732 0.000 0.000
11 0.626 0.000 3.457 0.000 0.000
12 1.000 26.529 0.000 34.740 115.947
13 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
14 0.805 0.000 0.000 342.570 86.179
15 0.982 0.000 0.000 19.703 0.000
16 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
17 0.780 0.000 17.234 1.805 0.000
18 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
19 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
20 0.862 0.000 0.000 79.056 333.376
21 0.960 14.475 0.000 0.000 0.000
22 1.000 14.044 0.000 151.719 76.574
23 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
24 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
25 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
26 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
27 0.795 0.000 0.000 0.000 30.754
28 1.000 35.666 0.000 63.847 131.437
29 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
30 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
31 0.855 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
32 0.665 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
33 1.000 9.610 0.000 17.351 32.833
Continued on next page
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Table 3.4 – continued from previous page
Input Slacks
DMU θ BD DR RN EM
34 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
35 1.000 19.876 0.000 18.162 92.682
36 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
37 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
38 0.700 0.000 6.068 18.782 0.000
39 0.816 0.000 0.000 66.621 0.000
40 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
41 0.930 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
42 0.865 0.000 154.352 10.323 276.688
43 0.664 0.000 0.000 76.219 0.000
44 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
45 1.000 5.406 0.000 9.570 97.840
46 0.930 0.000 0.000 0.000 446.988
47 0.751 24.741 0.000 0.000 0.000
48 0.691 0.000 0.000 32.361 0.000
49 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
50 0.756 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
51 0.769 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
52 0.863 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
53 0.719 0.000 0.114 0.000 0.000
54 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
55 0.765 26.702 0.256 0.000 0.000
56 0.582 0.000 0.009 37.609 0.000
57 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
58 0.807 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
59 0.943 0.000 6.398 26.081 151.206
60 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
61 0.682 6.599 0.000 9.303 0.000
62 0.833 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
63 0.634 0.000 47.065 0.131 0.000
64 1.000 60.360 0.000 56.639 156.688
65 0.842 0.000 0.000 0.000 97.216
66 0.895 0.000 0.000 0.000 61.436
67 0.620 0.000 6.729 0.000 0.000
68 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
69 0.679 0.000 0.000 6.231 0.000
70 0.821 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
71 1.000 1.276 0.000 1.801 34.413
72 0.747 62.983 0.000 27.002 0.000
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73 0.823 4.013 0.000 85.279 0.000
74 0.857 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
75 0.333 11.670 0.000 13.852 24.216
76 0.761 0.000 0.000 0.000 16.681
77 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
78 0.944 0.000 4.428 90.458 0.000
79 0.827 0.000 0.000 83.743 0.000
80 0.819 0.000 0.000 67.785 0.000
81 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
82 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
83 0.588 0.000 0.000 21.810 0.000
84 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
85 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
86 1.000 2.314 0.000 3.306 6.909
87 0.951 129.810 0.000 0.000 0.000
88 0.544 42.047 0.000 0.000 0.000
89 0.894 39.700 0.000 32.786 0.000
90 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
91 0.722 6.358 0.000 0.000 0.000
92 1.000 33.900 0.000 18.188 30.185
93 1.000 18.537 0.000 19.171 33.973
94 0.827 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
95 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
96 0.871 0.000 0.000 16.624 0.000
97 0.704 0.000 0.000 3.904 0.000
98 0.952 0.000 0.000 0.000 71.037
99 1.000 15.195 0.000 25.037 85.376
100 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
101 0.727 0.000 0.000 23.614 0.000
102 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
103 0.746 0.000 0.000 49.055 0.000
104 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
105 0.720 0.000 0.000 0.000 82.427
106 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
107 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
108 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
109 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
110 0.671 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
111 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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112 0.681 0.000 0.000 0.000 4.507
113 0.856 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
114 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
115 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
116 0.927 43.128 0.000 0.000 0.000
117 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
118 0.769 24.200 0.000 16.019 0.000
119 0.985 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
120 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
121 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
122 0.704 6.896 0.000 0.000 0.000
123 0.998 0.000 0.000 0.000 132.655
124 0.875 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
125 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
126 0.525 0.000 0.773 0.000 0.000
127 0.737 0.000 0.000 58.215 0.000
128 0.783 0.000 1.806 12.625 0.000
129 0.562 0.000 0.000 21.921 0.000
130 0.866 0.000 0.000 22.255 0.000
131 0.973 0.000 25.888 0.000 0.000
132 1.000 30.343 0.000 26.195 48.812
133 0.640 5.421 0.000 0.000 0.000
134 0.787 0.000 1.356 9.300 0.000
135 1.000 31.532 0.000 106.585 51.915
136 0.651 0.000 1.273 0.000 0.000
137 0.770 0.000 0.000 95.656 0.000
138 0.984 0.000 0.000 413.008 0.000
139 0.738 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
140 0.998 0.000 116.822 0.000 0.000
141 0.617 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
142 0.758 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
143 0.745 0.000 0.000 0.000 35.112
144 0.699 0.000 0.000 0.000 13.931
145 0.816 3.187 0.000 0.000 0.000
146 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
147 0.764 0.000 0.000 8.010 6.309
148 0.749 23.719 0.000 0.000 0.000
149 0.603 0.000 0.632 0.000 0.000
150 0.768 0.000 24.151 0.000 0.000
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151 0.801 37.500 0.000 0.000 0.000
152 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
153 0.700 0.000 7.143 0.000 49.870
154 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
155 0.703 0.000 0.000 53.707 0.000
156 0.677 0.000 0.000 0.000 30.461
157 0.713 0.000 0.000 52.656 0.000
158 0.650 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
159 0.723 43.497 0.000 20.602 0.000
160 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
161 0.847 8.553 120.274 0.000 0.000
162 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
163 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
164 1.000 6.958 0.000 9.482 16.236
165 1.000 13.099 0.000 18.304 38.084
166 0.688 0.000 0.000 3.419 0.000
167 1.000 19.125 0.000 5.270 14.004
168 0.754 28.699 0.000 0.000 0.000
169 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
170 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
171 0.668 0.000 0.000 1.647 0.000
172 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
173 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
174 0.981 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
175 0.939 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
176 0.701 0.000 0.162 0.000 2.602
177 0.621 0.000 1.166 0.000 0.000
178 0.673 0.000 0.532 5.781 0.000
179 0.829 0.000 0.000 12.886 0.000
180 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
181 1.000 39.966 0.000 36.503 207.567
182 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
183 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
184 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
185 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
186 0.896 0.000 0.042 0.000 17.448
187 0.829 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
188 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
189 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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190 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
191 0.956 0.000 0.000 8.032 38.928
192 0.540 0.000 0.000 0.000 16.556
193 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
194 0.752 0.000 0.768 0.000 14.140
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